The Accidental Guerrilla

David Kilcullen is imminently qualified to write an important and incisive piece on the war on terror, being one of Petraeus' top advisors in crafting the surge on the ground and a former Australian Army officer and scholar who fought in Timor and studied CI extensively. In the Accidental Guerilla he attempts to draw together lessons from his experiences ranging from studying in rural Indonesia (where he encounters likely Al-Qaeda affiliates who are definitely ethnic Arab and not local) to long tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq. His book is an attempt to understand the global phenomenon of radical takfiri extremism/terrorism, explain what has worked in Afghanistan and Iraq in contrast to what hasn't, discern general principles for counter-insurgency and "imposing" effective governance on essentially tribal societies, and at least proffer examples of what not to do in the strategic context of the war on terror. As a pre-cautionary note the book is very uneven in tone, ranging from polished text to pages on pages of raw field notes, to rough thoughts, to attempts to write Tom Clancy action sequences. It is poorly edited and feels extremely rushed, but given the timeliness of the information I concur with its current publishing as it is far more important to get this information out today than to make it a little more easy to read tomorrow.The phenomenon at the heart of Kilcullen's book is something he has witnessed throughout his travels in the muslim world at war. It is a trend centered on an ideological cadre of hardcore radical Islamic fighters that he identifies as "takfiri" to try to paint them, accurately it would seem, in a term that non extremist muslims can understand, dislike, and distinguish themselves from rather than a more amorphous and ambiguous "Islamic terrorist," of which Al-Qaeda would be a core group but not the only one. These vanguards enter poorly governed, socially rent apart areas and start a cycle of violence to try to achieve their aims of local control, eventually to piece together a caliphate bit by bit throughout Islam and beyond. Their tactic is to cause chaos, invite foreign (whatever is perceived locally as foreign, be it Americans in Afghanistan or non-Pashtun Pakistani troops in the NWFP) response, and get the locals to unite with them against the new "common enemy." Thus the locals, most of whom just want to be left alone but share an ethnic tie (particularly amongst Pashtun) or religious tie with the extremists, and usually live in tribal societies with a distinct code of honor, become "accidental guerillas" fighting the foreigners locally and inadvertently in support of the extremist's global cause. He does a particularly good job explaining the mechanics of how this phenomenon works in Afghanistan and how the Taliban uses it to gain control of regions. Combine the global terrorists, with the local guerillas, and add narco-criminal financing (i.e. poppies in Afghanistan, corruption/protection money in many countries, etc.) and you have what he calls "Hybrid War" something that goes beyond mere stovepipes of counter-terror, counter-insurgency, and counter-narcotics. Al-Qaeda believes it can use this strategy to morally, physically and financially exhaust the US and West by bogging it down in interventions that only sap them on strength while creating more accidental guerillas who wouldn't exist outside of those interventions.Kilcullen is at his best in the roughly first third of his book where he uses the case study of a road construction project in Afghanistan to show an example of how allied forces can use processes to partner with locals and cause their rejection of the takfiris. Although the Romans used road building in conquered lands to logistically and practically be able to introduce governance and to bring new subject peoples into the empire, Kilcullen's focus is on finding a local dynamic that the Allies can exploit that will benefit the locals demonstrably and decisively more than allying with the takfiris. This does not always mean road building per se, nor does it mean not fighting as ultimately routing out the takfiris and protecting the population will be step one. It's the process of once you've cleared an area, developing the local civil society to a point where, although they will not likely become a flowering democracy, they will reject further takfiri intervention and withstand some form of government security (which lacks in many parts of the world, be it Pakistani frontiers, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, etc.)His second third of the book focuses on the surge in Iraq and what was done to turn the situation there around. If you haven't read much about the surge this is obviously a good place to go for a decent synopsis of what happened and why. If you want to know more about the surge though I found "The Strongest Tribe" by Bing West to contain much the same information, with more detail, and with a more readable format.The book ends with the author's experiences in Timor showing that the Accidental Guerilla syndrome is a tactic that has been used outside the Islamic world and which can be dealt with successfully, although the example falls a little flat as Timor appears far less virulent than the problems the world now faces in Afghanistan, Yemen and other places. It also ends with his main strategic advice, which is mostly negative rather than positive. He has great rules and guidelines on what to do once in a place like Afghanistan or Iraq, but his end advice basically says to avoid more Iraqs rather than what to do.Although not perfect, this is extremely important and insightful information from a man who has a track record that speaks for him absolutely. A must read for anyone interested in what is going on in the War on Terror.

This is an ambitious work, with Kilcullen attempting to encompass everything from tactical to grand strategic responses to insurgency and terrorism in the one relatively short and accessible volume. Key to this work is Kilcullen's understanding of the fundamental difference between "Tier 1" guerrillas (or the 25% or so of most insurgent movements motivated by higher-order ideological grievances) and the "Tier 2" insurgents - or the "Accidental Guerrillas" of the title - who tend to be motivated by more local and parochial concerns. Kilcullen's theory of COIN and/or counterterrorism relies on the distinction he draws between the two, and the prospect of (ideally) preventing the rise of Tier 2 insurgents in the first place, or at the least co-opting them, while being reconciled to the military and political defeat of Tier 1. While only slightly more complex than schools of thought at either end of the spectrum that range from "Global Islamist Al-Qaeda conspiracy" or "root causes thanks to capitalism and US foreign policy" (or, everybody is Tier 1 or Tier 2 respectively), Kilcullen's perspective is a valuable corrective to either view.Kilcullen's policy prescriptions are in my view more clearly enunciated the closer he gets to the tactical level than the grand strategic. This is in part due to his reliance on case studies focused squarely on tactical and operational experience (considerable analysis/personal experience from Afghanistan and Iraq and somewhat more succinct studies of East Timor, Southern Thailand and Pakistan's Tribal Areas), which are mostly excellent. The discussion of Australian operations in East Timor is a little cringe-worthy - by not conceding there was no real, enduring Tier 1 threat against INTERFET that had any prospect of mobilising Tier 2 guerrillas, Kilcullen here sounds a bit too self-congratulatory and reminded me a bit of Running the War in Iraq: an Australian general, 300,000 troops, the bloodiest conflict of our time. His discussion of possible wider strategic responses to Islamic fundamentalist militancy is less prescriptive (if inclusive of a lot of good sense, in particular redressing the balance of military versus non-military means of state power) and not quite as compelling - I suspect partly due to the author's own ambivalence as to how serious the threat is. If it is largely a law enforcement problem as he argues in part, what is the necessity of a ARCADIA-style conference to hammer out a grand strategy between major powers struggling for national survival (as in 1942)? I fear that an ARCADIA between states not facing a perceived existential threat (or hoping to buck-pass their way out of it) would end up being more like a Munich Conference - somebody would end up being the people of which we know little getting their liberty traded away - perhaps better in these circumstances for liberal democracies to consider the issue "one campaign or crisis at a time"?For those with an interest in counterinsurgency, this is a "must read", if for no other reason that everybody else with an interest will have read it and formed an opinion. Fortunately, it is accessible, sensible and with a few real insights thrown in, and is worth the investment in time. A tiny bit under the five stars Amazon will let me give it, and I will take it with me when I deploy again in the near future - that has to be some sort of recommendation.

David Killcullen in Accidental Guerilla lays out a highly plausible theory on how nations involve themselves in these hybrid war types of combat. The bulk of this work is taken up by case studies on Iraq and Afghanistan, which well understandable given that’s where much of his experience is grounded. But it makes one wonder whether his experience can truly be translated to other conflicts. All of the cases sans one take place in Asia or have a complex powder keg of factors that render it perhaps a unique anomaly.I would have liked to see a little deeper work of the Europe case as well as South and Latin America among other regions to help strengthen the theory a little more. By not doing this enough, Killcullen makes it sound like you have to have powerful military resources to carry out such maneuvers and in all honesty that is a select group of countries indeed, given the current economic and political climate. What is less militarily endowed country to do?

In the midst of Conventional Warfare, there's a spectre of guerrilla Warfare which emerges unplanned.

Kilkullen knows what he is writing about. This book is a must read for everybody interested in the subject and desirous to understand today's situation with Guerilla Forces.

I wish more people would read this... It is enlightening reading, and so relevant for future foreign policy.

Clear, concise and very readable. Is the author an academic in military uniform or military in an academic suite...probably both. The author makes the point his book is too academic to be populist and too populist to be academic...(therefore it is pitched at the exact level for the remaining 99% of us).Regardless if you are an armchair pundit on "terrorism" or a military PHD historian or if you have any interest in what is happening in the World (packaged as the "War on Terror") or any interest in understanding insurgencies.....read this book!!!!Never has the adage that Counterinsurgency is 20% military 80% non military been so clearly narrated.I am not military, but can see (after reading this book) how our armies are built to fight conventional wars (ie: state vs state) as opposed to "small wars" (ie: insurgencies). The book highlights how this will not work in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq etc...if the Armies (ie: invading countries) are purely focused on destroying the "enemy" (territory held, head count, enemy destroyed, etc...).Dave Kilculen has advised General Petraeus in Iraq and is now advising General McChrystal in Afghanistan. To all junior commanders on the ground and civilian re-construction teams it is recommended you read this....(please).

A rare combination of academic research and combat experience makes Kilcullens' book the best book I have read on counterinsurgency in the post 9/11 world.

Das Buch gibt einen hervorragenden Einblick in das Phänomen des "zufälligen" Guerillakämpfers und wie dieser dazu wird. Dazu werden Konflikte an unterschiedlichen Schauplätzen wie im Irak, Osttimor oder Afghanistan als Beispiele genommen. Für das Verständnis, warum dieses Kriege nicht zur Ruhe kommen wesentlich, Leseempfehlung.